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ABSTRACT 
 
We use the NBER Shared Capitalism Database comprised of more than 40,000 employee 
surveys from 14 firms to explore whether a close match between workers’ risk preferences and 
the riskiness of their compensation packages relates to improved employee outcomes including 
lower absenteeism, lower shirking, lower probability of voluntary turnover, greater worker 
motivation, and higher levels of job satisfaction and loyalty.  To do this, we use survey questions 
reflecting workers’ risk aversion parameters, coupled with a series of measures of the riskiness 
of workers’ compensation packages including the proportion of pay comprised of various forms 
of shared capitalism such as profit and gain sharing, ownership of company stock, and bonus 
arrangements.  The primary finding of our paper is that a match between the workers’ risk 
preferences and the extent of risk in their compensation increases workers’ motivation, job 
satisfaction, company attachment, and loyalty, but risk-averse workers are generally less 
responsive to a preference-compensation match than risk-loving workers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Employee compensation packages are often comprised of both a fixed salary portion and 
a variable portion that is tied to firm, group, or individual output or performance. Examples of 
performance-based pay include profit-sharing, company stock and stock option payments, and 
group-level or individual-level performance bonuses. The prevalence of employee participation 
in the financial performance of firms and other performance-based pay schemes has been 
growing in the past several decades in the U.S. and other advanced economies. According to the 
2006 wave of the General Social Survey, which is a nationally representative survey of 
employees conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, over a third of U.S. workers are 
covered by profit sharing, 27 percent are covered by department- or team-based bonuses, 18 
percent own company stock, and 9 percent own company stock options. Coverage is similar in 
France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan (Jones and Kato 1995, Del Boca et. al. 1999).  
Firms use performance-based pay in employee compensation packages to induce greater 
worker effort and identification with the firm. However, performance-based pay introduces 
variability into compensation, which risk-averse workers dislike, and the greater the portion of 
compensation that is comprised of performance-based pay as opposed to a fixed salary, the 
greater is the compensation risk faced by the employee. In this study, we use the NBER Shared 
Capitalism Database, comprised of more than 40,000 employee surveys from 14 firms, to 
analyze whether a close match between workers’ risk preferences and the riskiness of their 
compensation packages is related to improved employee outcomes such as lower absenteeism, 
lower shirking, lower probability of voluntary turnover, greater worker motivation, and higher 
levels of job satisfaction and loyalty.  
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An advantage of our data is that they contain information on individual-level measures of 
risk aversion, which is often discussed as an important factor in worker attitudes towards 
variable pay, but is rarely measured. We use this information, coupled with measures of the 
riskiness, or variability, of workers’ compensation packages, including the proportion of pay 
comprised of various forms of shared capitalism such as ownership of company stock, profit and 
gain sharing, and bonus arrangements, to explore the consequences of alignment between risk 
preferences and compensation risk on worker outcomes. To our knowledge, this is the first study 
to empirically examine the implications of a preference-compensation risk match on employee 
outcomes. The primary finding of our paper is that a match between the worker’s risk 
preferences and the extent of risk in his or her compensation is associated with higher levels of  
motivation, job satisfaction, company attachment, and loyalty, but that risk-averse workers are 
generally less responsive to a preference-compensation match than risk-loving workers.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND PAST LITERATURE 
A basic assumption in most theoretical models of the employee-employer relationship is 
that the worker is risk averse, deriving greater utility, or happiness, from fixed pay over variable 
pay of equal expected value (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, Holmstrom 1979, Shavell 1979). 
Furthermore, the more risk averse the worker is, the greater will be the reduction in his or her 
utility generated by variability in pay. Workers who are very risk averse will prefer to have lower 
compensation risk than those who are less risk averse. Therefore, an alignment of risk 
preferences and compensation risk is likely to lead to improved utility, reflected in improved 
worker outcomes like job satisfaction and company attachment. 
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There have been a few previous studies examining the relation between risk preferences 
and attitudes towards variable pay, and a fairly large literature on the relation between variable 
pay and worker outcomes, but there have not been any prior studies looking at how an alignment 
of risk preferences and compensation risk may lead to improved worker outcomes. This is the 
primary contribution of our paper to the literature. The few past studies on the role of risk 
preferences in shaping attitudes toward variable pay found risk aversion to reduce worker 
preferences for variable pay in laboratory experiments (Cadsby, Song, and Tapon 2007) as well 
as in actual work environments (Kurtulus, Kruse and Blasi 2010, Cornelissen, Heywood and 
Jirjahn 2008). On the other hand, there is a fairly large literature exploring the relation between 
variable pay and worker outcomes. For example, Wilson and Peel (1991) and Brown, Fakfakh 
and Sessions (1999) found that employee participation in profit sharing and share ownership 
lowers absenteeism and quit rates, Bryson and Freeman (2010) found that employee ownership 
increases labor productivity and Blasi, Freeman, Mackin and Kruse (2010) found that it increases 
worker motivation, and Green and Heywood (2008) found that profit sharing and bonuses 
increase job satisfaction. Our study links these two branches of the literature by examining how a 
preference-compensation risk match influences worker outcomes. 
  
DATA AND VARIABLES 
We use the NBER Shared Capitalism Database, which consists of detailed information 
collected from more than 40,000 employee surveys from 14 firms, to explore whether a close 
match between workers’ risk preferences and the riskiness of their compensation packages 
relates to improved employee outcomes including lower absenteeism, lower probability of 
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voluntary turnover, greater worker motivation, and higher levels of job satisfaction, attachment 
to the company, loyalty, and innovation.  
The NBER data comprise one of the largest worker-level datasets on labor practices and 
worker sentiment ever collected. The survey was conducted during 2002-2006 using a 
combination of web-based and paper survey methods, and had a high response rate, averaging 53 
percent over the 14 companies. The firms participating in the survey included large 
multinationals with employment spanning North America, South America, Europe and Asia, as 
well as smaller firms with mostly US employees. The sample included eight firms in the 
manufacturing industry, two high-technology firms, and four in the service industry. Three of the 
fourteen companies exceeded 10,000 employees, five employed between 1,000 and 10,000 
workers, and the remaining six employed fewer than 1,000 workers. All of the firms had 
employee ownership and variable pay programs, though of varying forms and degrees: thirteen 
had individual bonus plans, nine had workgroup-based or department-based performance bonus 
plans, eleven had broad-based profit-sharing plans, five had broad-based stock option plans, 
eight had standard employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), one had a 401(k) employee stock 
ownership program, four had employee stock purchase plans, and three had 401(k)’s with 
company stock. Most had combinations of these plans.  
The NBER employees of course may not be representative of the overall U.S. 
workforce—indeed they work at firms that view shared capitalism favorably and may have 
joined these firms because they are more favorably inclined towards shared capitalism and less 
averse to the compensation risk it creates than other workers. Shared capitalism is, however, 
unlikely to be the determining factor for most employees in choosing whether to work at an 
organization, so in these companies we would expect to also find many employees who care little 
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about shared capitalism and took the job for other reasons (e.g., pay, location, job fit, career 
opportunities). Consistent with this, there is substantial variation within these companies in 
attitudes toward shared capitalism (Kurtulus, Kruse and Blasi 2010). Furthermore, the high 
incidence of shared capitalism across the U.S. economy (Kruse, Blasi, and Park 2010) provides 
an indication that the results may be generalizable to other firms and workers. 
In order to explore whether a close match between workers’ risk preferences and the 
riskiness of their compensation packages relates to improved employee outcomes, we must first 
define an appropriate measure that captures a match between risk preferences and compensation 
risk. To do so, we make use of two variables in the NBER Shared Capitalism Database. Our 
indicator of a worker’s risk preference is: 
LOVERISK = Worker’s self-assessment of his or her risk preference o a 0-10 scale, 
with 0 indicating the worker hates taking risk and 10 indicating the worker loves 
taking risk.
1
   
 
And, our indicator of how variable or risky is a worker’s compensation package is: 
 
COMPRISK = Share of the worker’s base salary that is comprised of performance-
related pay including cash profit-sharing, individual-based, workgroup-based or 
department-based performance bonuses.
 2,3
 
 
We divide the distribution of COMPRISK into two halves, below (low COMPRISK) and at or 
above (high COMPRISK) the median. LOVERISK takes on values 0,1,2,…,10, with 0 indicating 
that the worker dislikes taking risks and 10 indicating the worker enjoys taking risk, so we divide 
LOVERISK into two halves, below (low LOVERISK) and at or above (high LOVERISK) the 
value of 5 (risk neutral).
 4
 We then define the following indicators of match and non-match: 
 
MATCH = 1 if LOVERISK is high and COMPRISK is high, OR LOVERISK is low and 
COMPRISK is low; 0 otherwise. 
 
HIGHMATCH = 1 if LOVERISK is high and COMPRISK is high, 0 otherwise. 
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LOWMATCH = 1 if LOVERISK is low and COMPRISK is low, 0 otherwise. 
 
NOMATCH = 1 if LOVERISK is high and COMPRISK is low, OR LOVERISK is low 
and COMPRISK is high; 0 otherwise. 
 
NOMATCH10 = 1 if LOVERISK is high and COMPRISK is low, 0 otherwise. 
 
NOMATCH01 = 1 if LOVERISK is low and COMPRISK is high, 0 otherwise. 
 
Worker preference for risk has a mean of 5.6, but there is wide dispersion: LOVERISK 
equals 4 at the 25
th
 percentile, 6 at the 50
th
 percentile, and 7 at the 75
th
 percentile. Variable pay 
comprises 13 percent of base salary for the typical worker, but again there is considerable 
variation: COMPRISK is 2 percent at the 25
th
 percentile, 5 percent at the 50
th
 percentile, and 15 
percent at the 75
th
 percentile. Forty percent of workers have a high preference for risk and a high 
level of compensation risk (HIGHMATCH=1), 14 percent have a low preference for risk and 
low compensation risk (LOWMATCH=1), 36 percent have a high preference for risk but low 
compensation risk (NOMATCH10=1), and the remaining 10 percent of workers have a low 
preference for risk but high compensation risk (NOMATCH01=1).  
We examine the influence of alignment between risk preferences and compensation risk 
on the following worker outcome variables: 
DAYSABS =  Number of days absent in the last 6 months (non-vacation). 
 
LOOKHARD =  Worker reported likelihood that the worker will look hard for a job with 
another organization within the next twelve months on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 indicating 
“not at all likely”, 2 indicating “somewhat likely”, 3 indicating “very likely”, and 4 
indicating that the worker is “already looking”. 
 
MOTIVATION = The worker’s willingness to work harder than he or she has in the past 
in order to help the company succeed, with 1 indicating “strongly disagree”, 2 indicating 
“disagree”, 3 indicating “neither agree nor disagree”, 4 indicating “agree”, and 5 
indicating “strongly agree”. 
 
JOBSATISFAC: Worker’s job satisfaction at the company on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 
indicating “completely dissatisfied” and 7 indicating “completely satisfied”. 
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LONGTIME: Dummy variable indicating whether the worker sees himself or herself 
working at the company for the foreseeable future, with 1 indicating “yes” and 0 
indicating “no”. 
 
LOYAL: Degree of loyalty the worker feels towards the company on a scale of 1 to 4, 
with 1 indicating “no loyalty at all”, 2 “only a little”, 3 “some” and 4 “a lot” 
 
SUGGESTIONS: Worker reported frequency of suggestions to improve department or 
company effectiveness made to someone in the company in the past, with values 1-never, 
2-occasionally, 3-monthly, 4-weekly, 5-daily. 
 
Our regression specifications also include a wide array of worker characteristics as 
control variables that are likely to influence worker outcomes like motivation and attachment to 
the firm, and that may also be correlated with the worker’s risk preferences and the riskiness of 
his or her compensation. For instance, past research has shown women, older workers, workers 
with greater tenure at the firm, and workers with lower education and salary levels to be more 
risk averse (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, Dohmen et al. 2007, Dohmen and Falk 2006, 
Kurtulus, Kruse and Blasi 2010). Many of these variables are also correlated with our worker 
outcome variables, so not controlling for them would yield biased estimates of the relationship 
between a preference-compensation match and worker outcomes. We additionally control for 
whether the worker believes his or her pay is at or above market level since this is likely to 
influence the relation between that worker’s preference-compensation risk match and that 
worker’s attachment to the firm, loyalty, motivation, and so on. A worker whose risk preferences 
and compensation risk are aligned may work longer hours because he or she derives greater 
enjoyment from his or her job, and this will also be reflected in his or her motivation, job 
satisfaction, and company attachment, so we also control for weekly hours worked. Lastly, in a 
few of the NBER firms, workers in specific occupations and those who are union members are 
not eligible to participate in certain profit sharing and bonus programs, so we include controls for 
the worker’s occupation and union status.  
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The control variables we include in all our regression models are defined below: 
AGE = Worker age. 
 
FEMALE = 1 if worker is female, 0 otherwise. 
 
UNION = 1 if worker is a union worker, 0 otherwise. 
 
TENURE = Worker’s tenure at the firm, in years. 
 
BASEPAY = Worker’s annual base pay the previous year excluding overtime, bonuses 
and commissions. 
 
HOURS = Worker’s weekly hours worked. 
 
ATMKT = 1 if the worker believes that his annual base salary at the firm is at or above 
the going market rate for employees in other companies with similar experience and job 
descriptions in the region, 0 otherwise.  
 
Ethnicity Indicators 
 
WHITE = 1 if worker is white, 0 otherwise. 
 
HISPANIC = 1 if worker is Hispanic, 0 otherwise. 
 
BLACK = 1 if worker is black, 0 otherwise. 
 
ASIAN = 1 if worker is Asian, 0 otherwise. 
 
NATIVE AMERICAN = 1 if worker is Native American, 0 otherwise. 
 
OTHER = 1 if worker is Other, 0 otherwise. 
 
Education Indicators 
 
NO HIGH SCHOOL = 1 if worker does not hold a high school degree, 0 otherwise. 
 
HIGH SCHOOL = 1 if worker’s highest educational degree is a high school degree 
including GED, 0 otherwise. 
 
SOME COLLEGE = 1 if worker has attended some college but has not received a 
bachelor’s degree, 0 otherwise. 
 
ASSOCIATE DEGREEE = 1 if worker’s highest educational degree is an associate’s 
degree, 0 otherwise. 
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COLLEGE = 1 if worker’s highest educational degree is a bachelor’s degree, 0 
otherwise. 
 
GRADUATE SCHOOL = 1 if worker’s highest educational degree is a master’s, 
professional or doctoral degree, 0 otherwise. 
 
Occupation Indicators 
 
PRODUCTION:  1 if worker’s occupation is production, 0 otherwise. 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT = 1 if worker’s occupation is administrative support, 0 
otherwise. 
 
PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL = 1 if worker’s occupation is professional and 
technical (including engineers and scientists), 0 otherwise. 
 
SALES = 1 if worker’s occupation is sales, 0 otherwise. 
 
CUSTOMER SERVICE = 1 if worker’s occupation is customer service, 0 otherwise. 
 
MANAGEMENT = 1 if worker’s occupation is management, 0 otherwise. 
 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are provided in Table 1. 
 
[TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
RESULTS 
 
Our hypothesis is that a match between the worker’s risk preferences and extent of risk in 
his or her cash compensation will result in improved worker outcomes (lower absenteeism, lower 
likelihood of looking for a new job, higher motivation, greater job satisfaction, higher likelihood 
of staying with the company in the future, greater loyalty, and higher frequency of suggestions). 
This implies MATCH, HIGHMATCH and LOWMATCH should be associated with better 
worker outcomes, while NOMATCH, NOMATCH10 and NOMATCH01 should be associated 
with worse worker outcomes. Therefore we expect the relationships between the match variables 
and the worker outcome variables to have the following signs (and the non-match variables to 
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have the opposite of these signs):  DAYSABS (-), LOOKHARD (-), MOTIVATION (+), 
JOBSATISFAC (+), LONGTIME (+), LOYAL (+), SUGGESTIONS (+). 
As a first step in exploring whether a match between the worker’s risk preferences and 
extent of risk in his or her compensation results in improved worker outcomes, we estimate 
regressions of each outcome variable on MATCH and worker controls. These results are 
presented in Table 2. We use OLS to estimate all except for the DAYSABS equation, where we 
estimate a Tobit model since that outcome variable is left-censored at zero, and LONGTIME, 
where we estimate a Probit model (with table entries indicating the Probit marginal effects) since 
that outcome variable is a dummy variable.  
[TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
The revealed relationships between MATCH and the various outcome measures 
overwhelmingly support our hypothesis that a match between the worker’s risk preferences and 
extent of risk in his or her compensation will result in improved worker outcomes. The negative 
and statistically significant effects of MATCH on DAYSABS and LOOKHARD indicate that 
workers whose compensation risk match their risk attitudes exhibit lower absenteeism and lower 
intention to leave the firm. Table 2 also reveals that a match between the worker’s risk 
preferences and extent of risk in his or her compensation increases worker motivation, job 
satisfaction, company attachment and loyalty. Frequency of suggestions to improve department 
or company effectiveness is the only outcome variable which is not statistically significantly 
associated with MATCH (last column). 
The results in Table 2 support our hypothesis that a match between the worker’s risk 
preferences and extent of risk in his or her compensation will result in improved worker 
outcomes, but also of interest is the possibility that the way in which employees respond to a 
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match will be different among risk-loving versus risk-averse workers. A possible reason for this 
asymmetry is that workers who are more risk averse may be more reluctant to leave their job to 
seek another one when they don’t have a preference-compensation match, since they may not 
want to bear the uncertainty associated with being unemployed or not knowing how much better 
their new job will suit them. To explore possible asymmetries in the match response among the 
risk-loving and the risk-averse, we regress our worker outcome variables on the more specific 
match variables HIGHMATCH (which equals 1if the worker is risk-loving and faces high 
compensation-risk, 0 otherwise) and LOWMATCH (which equals 1 if the worker is risk-averse 
and faces low compensation-risk, 0 otherwise) against the omitted category of NOMATCH 
(which equals 1 if the worker’s risk preference does not match his or her compensation-risk 
level), controlling for the full set of worker characteristics.  
The estimates presented in Table 3 reveal that the risk-averse are generally less 
responsive to a match while the risk-loving respond in the expected manner with improved 
outcomes:  the coefficient on HIGHMATCH has the expected statistically significant sign in 
every equation except in the LOOKHARD equation, while the only outcome variables which 
have the expected relationship with LOWMATCH are DAYSABS and LOOKHARD. For 
example, the effect of a preference-compensation match on lowering absenteeism is stronger for 
risk-loving workers; and a match results in higher job satisfaction, firm attachment and loyalty 
among risk-loving workers as we would expect but has no statistically significant effect among 
risk-averse workers. Also of note is the surprising result that among the risk-averse the effect of 
a match on motivation and the frequency of innovative suggestions is lower in comparison to 
those with no preference-compensation match (the omitted group). We say more on the finding 
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that a match between the preferences of risk-averse workers and compensation risk does not 
necessarily improve outcomes at the end of this section.  
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
We next turn to a closer analysis of workers whose risk preferences do not match their 
compensation risk, i.e., those who either are risk-loving but face low compensation risk 
(NOMATCH10=1), or those who are risk-averse but face high compensation risk 
(NOMATCH01=1). We do this to explore the possibility that among workers whose risk 
preferences do not match the extent of compensation risk they face (i.e., NOMATCH=1) there 
may be asymmetries in behavior. For example, a lack of a match may result in inferior worker 
outcomes for the risk-loving but not the risk-averse, following the same reasoning introduced 
earlier, i.e., that the risk averse may be reluctant to leave their job and seek another thereby 
incurring income uncertainty associated with unemployment. To investigate this, using the 
subsample of workers whose risk-preferences do not match their compensation risk, we estimate 
regressions of our seven worker outcome variables on NOMATCH10 against the omitted 
category NOMATCH01, controlling for the full set of worker characteristics. The results in 
Table 4 reveal that among workers with no match, the risk-loving workers look harder for 
another job, have higher motivation, lower job satisfaction, lower intention to stay at the firm, 
and are less loyal to the firm, but offer more suggestions, than those who are risk-averse. Put 
differently, the risk-averse are generally less negatively affected by a mismatch between their 
risk preferences and the compensation risk they face.  
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
This echoes our earlier finding that for risk-averse workers a preference-compensation 
match does not necessarily improve outcomes, and in some cases may even lower worker 
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performance. There are at least four possible explanations for this. One is that even risk-averse 
workers like having output-contingent compensation despite their aversion to the variability it 
creates in their pay, perhaps because seeing their risk-loving colleagues receive variable 
compensation creates a desire for it among them as well, or because profit-sharing and bonuses 
instill a sense of ownership and cooperation that workers like despite their disutility from the risk 
it imposes on their earnings. Both risk-loving and risk-averse workers seem to have a baseline 
appreciation of the notion of incentives tied to performance, and while the risk-averse might 
prefer a less intense version of this scenario, it is not necessarily the case that they are not 
motivated by incentives. This issue is explored in greater detail in another paper of ours on 
worker attitudes towards different forms of employee ownership (Kurtulus, Blasi, and Kruse, 
2010). Expanding on the findings that a preference-compensation match does not always yield 
improved outcomes in the case of risk-averse workers, we use a subsample of employees who 
have a low tolerance for risk (i.e., low LOVERISK) to estimate regressions of our seven 
employee outcome variables on NOMATCH01 (i.e., the person is risk-averse but faces high 
compensation risk) against the base group of workers who are risk-averse and face low 
compensation risk, controlling for the full set of worker characteristics. Results are illustrated in 
Appendix Table A. There is indeed some evidence that risk-averse workers exhibit better 
outcomes when they face high compensation risk than when they face low compensation risk in 
the case of attachment to the firm, loyalty, and frequency of innovative suggestions; however, in 
the case of the remaining outcome variables the results are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
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A related potential explanation is that workers may respond favorably to having choice 
over the composition of their compensation rather than the firm choosing this paternalistically 
for them. We find some evidence supporting this hypothesis in the next section.  
Risk-averse workers may also not mind performance-related pay when it is “gravy” on 
top of regular base pay, rather than substituting for base pay, in which case it may be seen as an 
uncertain gift from the company rather than something that may harm one’s economic position. 
The evidence from both national and company surveys indicates that shared capitalism pay tends 
to supplement rather than substitute for base pay (Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi 2010). The relation 
between performance-related pay, base pay, and risk aversion is a valuable area for further 
research. 
Finally, previous research has shown profit sharing, employee ownership and other forms 
of variable pay to be most effective in increasing productivity and performance when 
implemented as part of a package of complementary high-performance workplace practices such 
as delegation of decision-making rights to workers, team production, and on-the-job training 
(Ichniowski, et. al. 1996, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997, Becker and Huselid 1998, 
Blasi, Freeman, Mackin and Kruse 2010); a match between risk preference and compensation 
risk may improve outcomes even for risk-averse workers when combined with complementary 
high-performance workplace practices. Though we do not explore this in the current paper, we 
view it as a fruitful avenue for future research. 
 
Robustness Analysis 
 
We also investigate an alternative compensation risk variable which includes further 
measures of employee ownership, in particular the value of stock and option holdings of the 
worker: 
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COMPRISK1 = Share of the worker’s base salary that is comprised of performance-
related pay (including profit-sharing, individual-based, workgroup-based or 
department-based performance bonuses), company stock held in ESOPs, 401K plans, 
and bought in the open market, and potential profit from exercising company 
options.
5
 
 
The advantage of COMPRISK1 is that it is more inclusive of different forms of employee 
ownership and employee equity participation than COMPRISK. We estimate all our regressions 
using this alternative compensation risk measure COMPRISK1, and the associated match 
variables MATCH1, HIGHMATCH1, LOWMATCH1, NOMATCH101, NOMATCH011 
(constructed exactly as before except using COMPRISK1 instead of COMPRISK).
 6
  As seen in 
Tables 5-7, the estimated relationships of interest are generally qualitatively the same in sign and 
significance, but the magnitudes are slightly smaller when compared to the estimates from the 
regressions which used COMPRISK.  
[TABLE 5 AROUND HERE] 
[TABLE 6 AROUND HERE] 
[TABLE 7 AROUND HERE] 
Nevertheless, we prefer COMPRISK over COMPRISK1 and treat it as our main 
compensation risk measure for two reasons. First, COMPRISK is a sharper measure of the share 
of salary comprised of variable pay in a given year, while COMPRISK1 includes cumulative 
forms of employee ownership and employee equity participation that have been amassed over 
several years. Specifically, COMPRISK pertains to the portion of the worker’s base salary 
comprised of profit-sharing and performance bonuses in a given year, while the stock and option 
holdings included in COMPRISK1 pertain to cumulative holdings and not just stock and option 
grants in a given year. Second, while the workers have no choice over the portion of salary 
comprised of profit-sharing and bonuses captured in COMPRISK, some components of 
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COMPRISK1 are subject to employee choice in a number of the firms in the NBER survey 
where workers had discretion over their investments in company stock. Using a compensation 
risk measure over which the worker has no choice, namely COMPRISK, helps prevent 
endogeneity bias in the regression estimates since the dependent variables are unlikely to affect 
COMPRISK (while they might plausibly affect worker decisions to purchase stock, so the 
COMPRISK1 specification will yield biased estimates due to reverse causality).
 7
   
 
CONCLUSION 
Past studies on risk preferences, compensation risk, and employee outcomes have either 
focused on the role of risk aversion in shaping attitudes toward variable pay, or on the relation 
between variable pay and worker outcomes.  Our paper is the first study to link these two 
branches of the literature by examining how a preference-compensation risk match influences 
worker outcomes. Our primary finding is that a match between the worker’s risk preferences and 
the extent of risk in his or her compensation increases motivation, job satisfaction, company 
attachment and loyalty, though the risk-averse are generally less responsive to a preference-
compensation match than the risk-loving. We also find that the risk-averse are generally less 
negatively affected by a preference-compensation mismatch than the risk-loving, and shared 
capitalism is linked to improving numerous worker outcomes even among the risk-averse. These 
results suggest that even risk-averse workers do not react badly, and in many cases may respond 
positively, to having at least a portion of their pay comprised of variable pay despite the fact that 
it introduces risk into their compensation. 
Thus our findings shed a favorable light upon variable pay and employee ownership. One 
of the common criticisms made against employee ownership is that it has the downside of 
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imposing compensation risk onto workers, but our results suggest that this may not reduce 
worker utility as standard theories would predict. We therefore view our results as a valuable 
contribution to the employee ownership literature, enabling us to update our beliefs on how 
workers react to employee ownership. 
The General Social Survey of 2006 shows that 46.7 percent of workers in the private 
sector workforce have some combination of profit or gain sharing, employee stock ownership or 
employee stock options. Indeed, almost half, 48.6 percent, of for-profit companies have one or 
more of these shared capitalist practices that provide workers with income based on the 
performance of the underlying capital of firms, and 62.6 percent of workers in corporations with 
stock have one or more of these practices. These levels of incidence demonstrate that the NBER 
Shared Capitalism Data which our analysis is based on does not merely reflect information on a 
small niche but a meaningful sector within the economy. Furthermore, while inflation-adjusted 
wages have been relatively flat since the 1980s, capital income has been shown to play an 
important role in increasing inflation-adjusted family wealth (Mishel, Bernstein, and Shierholz, 
2009). We therefore view further study of shared capitalist practices to be a subject that merits 
continued research. 
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ENDNOTES 
1
 The wording of the survey question is: “Some people like to take risks and others dislike taking 
risks. Where would you place yourself on a scale of how much you like or dislike taking risks, 
where 0 is hating to take any kind of risk and 10 is loving to take risks?” 
2
 This variable is constructed as the ratio of two variables BONVAL, which indicates the total 
dollar value of performance-based payments in the previous year including profit-sharing, 
individual-based, workgroup-based or department-based performance bonuses, and BASEPAY, 
which indicates the worker’s annual base pay the previous year excluding overtime, bonuses and 
commissions. 
3
 Later in the paper as a robustness check we also investigate an alternative compensation risk 
variable that includes further measures of employee ownership like stock and option holdings. 
However, we prefer COMPRSIK and treat it as our main compensation risk variable because it is 
a sharper measure of the share of salary comprised of variable pay in a given year (while the 
alternative measure includes cumulative forms of employee equity participation that have been 
amassed over multiple years) and workers have no choice over the portion of salary comprised of 
profit sharing and bonuses captured in COMPRISK (while some components of the alternative 
measure are subject to employee choice in a number of firms in the NBER Survey creating 
potential endogeneity bias in the regression estimates). Our key regression results are robust to 
using the alternative compensation risk measure.  
4
 We also tried dividing the distribution of COMPRISK into three at the 33
rd
 and 66
th
 percentiles, 
and LOVERISK into three at 4 and 7, defining MATCH, HIGHMATCH and LOWMATCH 
similarly, but also defining MIDMATCH to indicate match in the center of the two distributions. 
The regression results were qualitatively very similar.  
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5
 This variable is constructed from the NBER Shard Capitalism Survey’s variables  as 
(BONVAL+EOVAL2+SOVAL)/BASEPAY. 
6  COMPRISK1 equals 5 percent at the 25
th
 percentile, 35 percent at the 50
th
 percentile, and 123 
percent at the 75
th
 percentile of its distribution. Thirty-nine percent of workers have a high 
preference for risk and a high level of compensation risk (HIGHMATCH1=1), 14 percent have a 
low preference for risk and low compensation risk (LOWMATCH1=1), 36 percent have a high 
preference for risk but low compensation risk (NOMATCH101=1), and the remaining 11 percent 
of workers have a low preference for risk but high compensation risk (NOMATCH011=1). 
7
 We re-estimated the regressions in Tables 5-7 using the subset of seven firms in the NBER 
Survey where the workers had no choice over their variable pay to get around the endogeneity of 
COMPRISK1, but the regression sample sizes were much smaller than the samples sizes in 
Tables 5-7 resulting in low precision in the estimates (these were some of the smaller firms in the 
NBER Survey). The coefficient estimates that were statistically significant, however, were larger 
in magnitude than both the estimates using COMPRISK1 in Tables 5-7 and the estimates using 
COMPRISK in Tables 2-4, suggesting that workers who have choice over the portion of pay that 
is variable are more responsive to a preference-compensation match, consistent with our earlier 
finding that the estimates of interest in the COMPRISK regressions in Tables 2-4 were found to 
be larger in magnitude than the COMPRISK1 results in Tables 5-7 also suggesting that  choice 
leads to greater responsiveness to a match. These auxiliary regression results are available from 
the authors. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
loverisk 5.60 2.44 0 10 41,695 
comprisk 0.13 0.88 0 125 27,437 
daysabs 1.73 7.41 0 180 44,651 
lookhard 1.57 0.83 1 4 46,202 
motivation 4.02 0.90 1 5 45,832 
jobsatisfac 5.03 1.30 1 7 43,413 
longtime 0.82 0.39 0 1 46,061 
loyal 3.33 0.80 1 4 42,350 
suggestions 2.22 0.84 1 5 33,423 
match 0.54 0.50 0 1 27,134 
highmatch 0.40 0.49 0 1 27,134 
lowmatch 0.14 0.35 0 1 27,134 
nomatch 0.46 0.50 0 1 27,134 
nomatch10 0.36 0.48 0 1 27,134 
nomatch01 0.10 0.30 0 1 27,134 
age 40.93 10.50 16 84 36,791 
female 0.31 0.46 0 1 38,325 
union 0.12 0.32 0 1 46,269 
tenure 9.54 8.98 0 51.08 45,755 
basepay 54,820.22 41,997.23 600 1,000,000 30,457 
hours 45.79 8.14 0 100 45,696 
atmkt 0.59 0.49 0 1 36,236 
Ethnicity:      
white 0.77 0.42 0 1 36,061 
hispanic 0.07 0.26 0 1 36,061 
black 0.05 0.21 0 1 36,061 
asian 0.08 0.27 0 1 36,061 
native american 0.01 0.11 0 1 36,061 
other 0.02 0.15 0 1 36,061 
Education:      
no high school 0.04 0.19 0 1 35,758 
high school 0.23 0.42 0 1 35,758 
some college 0.22 0.41 0 1 35,758 
associate degree 0.08 0.28 0 1 35,758 
college 0.28 0.45 0 1 35,758 
graduate school 0.14 0.34 0 1 39,436 
Occupation:      
production 0.43 0.50 0 1 45,816 
administrative support 0.06 0.24 0 1 45,816 
professional and technical 0.30 0.46 0 1 45,816 
sales 0.06 0.23 0 1 45,816 
customer service 0.03 0.17 0 1 45,800 
management 0.13 0.33 0 1 45,816 
Note: Based on the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey of N = 46,907 workers. 
24 
 
 
Table 2: Effect of MATCH (against omitted base group NOMATCH) on Worker Outcomes 
(using compensation risk variable COMPRISK) 
 
 daysabs lookhard motivation jobsatisfac longtime loyal suggestions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
match -0.642*** -0.030** 0.038*** 0.075*** 0.014** 0.063*** -0.021 
 (0.230) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013) 
age -0.078*** -0.009*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.008*** -0.004*** 
 (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
female 2.818*** -0.092*** 0.077*** 0.109*** 0.020*** 0.100*** -0.119*** 
 (0.320) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) 
union 0.549 0.266*** -0.117*** -0.191*** -0.086*** -0.134*** 0.010 
 (0.660) (0.036) (0.036) (0.052) (0.015) (0.033) (0.030) 
tenure -0.006 -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.001** -0.000 0.003*** 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
basepay 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
hours -0.160*** 0.002** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.001** 0.006*** 0.008*** 
 (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
atmkt -0.798*** -0.278*** 0.181*** 0.449*** 0.092*** 0.245*** -0.030** 
 (0.231) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) 
Ethnicity:        
hispanic -1.389*** 0.025 0.168*** 0.225*** -0.034** 0.123*** 0.066* 
 (0.458) (0.028) (0.029) (0.045) (0.013) (0.025) (0.035) 
black -0.626 0.170*** 0.159*** 0.061 -0.045*** -0.103*** -0.182*** 
 (0.582) (0.036) (0.036) (0.052) (0.015) (0.032) (0.030) 
asian -3.266*** 0.017 0.224*** 0.017 -0.033*** 0.054*** -0.021 
 (0.453) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.010) (0.019) (0.036) 
native american 0.515 -0.003 0.087 0.131 -0.040 -0.030 -0.068 
 (1.102) (0.059) (0.067) (0.093) (0.029) (0.057) (0.054) 
other -0.425 0.160*** 0.046 -0.082 -0.057*** 0.019 0.050 
 (0.766) (0.050) (0.045) (0.063) (0.021) (0.040) (0.059) 
Education:        
high school -0.155 -0.048 -0.033 0.021 0.027* -0.012 -0.044 
 (0.840) (0.040) (0.046) (0.071) (0.016) (0.040) (0.040) 
some college 0.806 0.051 -0.022 -0.122* 0.003 -0.002 0.053 
 (0.844) (0.040) (0.046) (0.071) (0.017) (0.039) (0.041) 
associate degree -0.779 0.095** -0.041 -0.195*** -0.031 -0.023 0.060 
 (0.876) (0.043) (0.049) (0.075) (0.020) (0.042) (0.043) 
college -1.414* 0.128*** -0.058 -0.223*** -0.035* -0.030 0.154*** 
 (0.853) (0.041) (0.047) (0.072) (0.019) (0.040) (0.043) 
graduate school -2.284** 0.149*** -0.077 -0.227*** -0.058*** -0.025 0.175*** 
 (0.902) (0.043) (0.049) (0.074) (0.021) (0.041) (0.048) 
Occupation:        
administrative support -1.539*** -0.151*** 0.296*** 0.269*** 0.046*** 0.327*** -0.005 
 (0.545) (0.030) (0.030) (0.048) (0.011) (0.026) (0.024) 
professional and technical -0.537 -0.132*** 0.227*** 0.253*** 0.040*** 0.293*** 0.089*** 
 (0.333) (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.008) (0.017) (0.020) 
sales -3.412*** -0.237*** 0.300*** 0.439*** 0.070*** 0.450*** -0.052* 
 (0.511) (0.025) (0.027) (0.039) (0.009) (0.022) (0.028) 
customer service -0.840 -0.136*** 0.316*** 0.030 0.027* 0.298*** 0.067** 
 (0.616) (0.037) (0.040) (0.062) (0.015) (0.035) (0.032) 
management -1.935*** -0.196*** 0.366*** 0.422*** 0.068*** 0.432*** 0.455*** 
 (0.399) (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.008) (0.020) (0.028) 
Constant 6.713*** 2.146*** 3.214*** 4.071***   2.367*** 1.901*** 
 (1.209) (0.062) (0.066) (0.099)  (0.057) (0.068) 
Observations 19218 19566 19594 19618 19571 19307 13904 
Pseudo R-squared 0.013       0.053     
Adjusted R-squared   0.074 0.081 0.066   0.114 0.122 
Note:  Equations are estimated using OLS except for the DAYSABS equation which is estimated using Tobit, and the LONGTIME equation 
which is estimated using Probit (with Probit marginal effects presented in table entries). Robust standard are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  The omitted category for the ethnicity dummy variable group is WHITE, the omitted 
category for the education dummy variable group is NO HIGH SCHOOL, the omitted category for the occupation dummy variable group is 
PRODUCTION.    
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Table 3: Effect of HIGHMATCH and LOWMATCH (against omitted base group 
NOMATCH) on Worker Outcomes (using compensation risk variable COMPRISK) 
 
 daysabs lookhard motivation jobsatisfac longtime loyal suggestions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
highmatch -0.645** -0.010 0.090*** 0.094*** 0.015** 0.094*** 0.065*** 
 (0.261) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.006) (0.013) (0.016) 
lowmatch -0.637* -0.071*** -0.070*** 0.034 0.011 -0.002 -0.136*** 
 (0.332) (0.018) (0.020) (0.029) (0.008) (0.018) (0.016) 
age -0.078*** -0.009*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.008*** -0.004*** 
 (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
female 2.817*** -0.087*** 0.088*** 0.114*** 0.020*** 0.107*** -0.103*** 
 (0.324) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) 
union 0.549 0.269*** -0.110*** -0.188*** -0.086*** -0.129*** 0.021 
 (0.662) (0.036) (0.036) (0.052) (0.015) (0.033) (0.030) 
tenure -0.006 -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.001** -0.000 0.003*** 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
basepay 0.000 -0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
hours -0.160*** 0.002** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.001** 0.005*** 0.008*** 
 (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
atmkt -0.798*** -0.278*** 0.181*** 0.448*** 0.092*** 0.245*** -0.029** 
 (0.231) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) 
Ethnicity:        
hispanic -1.389*** 0.024 0.165*** 0.224*** -0.034** 0.121*** 0.059* 
 (0.458) (0.028) (0.029) (0.045) (0.013) (0.025) (0.035) 
black -0.626 0.169*** 0.156*** 0.060 -0.045*** -0.104*** -0.186*** 
 (0.583) (0.036) (0.036) (0.053) (0.015) (0.032) (0.030) 
asian -3.265*** 0.014 0.214*** 0.013 -0.034*** 0.047** -0.037 
 (0.454) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.010) (0.019) (0.036) 
native american 0.515 -0.002 0.090 0.131 -0.040 -0.030 -0.064 
 (1.101) (0.059) (0.068) (0.093) (0.029) (0.057) (0.054) 
other -0.424 0.157*** 0.040 -0.084 -0.057*** 0.016 0.045 
 (0.766) (0.050) (0.045) (0.063) (0.021) (0.040) (0.059) 
Education:        
high school -0.155 -0.048 -0.033 0.021 0.027* -0.012 -0.045 
 (0.840) (0.040) (0.046) (0.071) (0.016) (0.040) (0.040) 
some college 0.806 0.047 -0.032 -0.126* 0.003 -0.008 0.040 
 (0.844) (0.040) (0.046) (0.071) (0.017) (0.039) (0.040) 
associate degree -0.779 0.091** -0.053 -0.199*** -0.031 -0.029 0.044 
 (0.878) (0.043) (0.049) (0.075) (0.020) (0.042) (0.043) 
college -1.413* 0.121*** -0.076 -0.230*** -0.035* -0.041 0.129*** 
 (0.856) (0.041) (0.047) (0.072) (0.019) (0.040) (0.043) 
graduate school -2.283** 0.142*** -0.095** -0.234*** -0.058*** -0.036 0.153*** 
 (0.905) (0.043) (0.049) (0.074) (0.022) (0.041) (0.048) 
Occupation:        
administrative support -1.538*** -0.154*** 0.288*** 0.267*** 0.046*** 0.322*** -0.011 
 (0.546) (0.030) (0.030) (0.048) (0.011) (0.026) (0.024) 
professional and technical -0.536 -0.140*** 0.207*** 0.245*** 0.039*** 0.281*** 0.073*** 
 (0.340) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.008) (0.018) (0.020) 
sales -3.410*** -0.249*** 0.269*** 0.427*** 0.070*** 0.431*** -0.096*** 
 (0.522) (0.026) (0.027) (0.040) (0.009) (0.022) (0.028) 
customer service -0.839 -0.137*** 0.313*** 0.029 0.027* 0.296*** 0.063* 
 (0.616) (0.037) (0.039) (0.061) (0.015) (0.035) (0.032) 
management -1.934*** -0.205*** 0.342*** 0.413*** 0.067*** 0.417*** 0.422*** 
 (0.407) (0.022) (0.024) (0.035) (0.008) (0.020) (0.028) 
Constant 6.711*** 2.161*** 3.256*** 4.086***   2.392*** 1.948*** 
 (1.216) (0.062) (0.067) (0.099)  (0.057) (0.068) 
Observations 19218 19566 19594 19618 19571 19307 13904 
Pseudo R-squared 0.013       0.053     
Adjusted R-squared   0.074 0.084 0.066   0.115 0.128 
Note:  Equations are estimated using OLS except for the DAYSABS equation which is estimated using Tobit., and the LONGTIME equation 
which is estimated using Probit (with Probit marginal effects presented in table entries). Robust standard are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  The omitted category for the ethnicity dummy variable group is WHITE, the omitted 
category for the education dummy variable group is NO HIGH SCHOOL, the omitted category for the occupation dummy variable group is 
PRODUCTION.    
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Table 4: In the subsample of workers with NOMATCH=1 (i.e., MATCH=0), Effect of 
NOMATCH10 (against omitted base group NOMATCH01) on Worker Outcomes (using 
compensation risk variable COMPRISK) 
 
 daysabs lookhard motivation jobsatisfac longtime loyal suggestions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
nomatch10 -0.111 0.178*** 0.045* -0.110*** -0.062*** -0.097*** 0.128*** 
 (0.414) (0.022) (0.023) (0.034) (0.010) (0.021) (0.022) 
age -0.091*** -0.010*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.001* 0.009*** -0.003*** 
 (0.022) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
female 3.198*** -0.102*** 0.132*** 0.154*** 0.033*** 0.148*** -0.110*** 
 (0.517) (0.021) (0.021) (0.032) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) 
union 0.909 0.175*** -0.103** -0.165*** -0.059*** -0.119*** 0.012 
 (0.925) (0.042) (0.043) (0.064) (0.019) (0.039) (0.036) 
tenure -0.023 -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.001 -0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.028) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
basepay 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
hours -0.139*** 0.002* 0.006*** 0.002 0.001* 0.005*** 0.007*** 
 (0.037) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
atmkt -0.604 -0.291*** 0.182*** 0.464*** 0.098*** 0.266*** -0.048*** 
 (0.395) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) 
Ethnicity:        
hispanic -1.720** 0.022 0.205*** 0.277*** -0.008 0.142*** 0.094** 
 (0.785) (0.042) (0.045) (0.069) (0.020) (0.040) (0.047) 
black -0.154 0.192*** 0.151*** 0.068 -0.040* -0.126*** -0.155*** 
 (0.909) (0.048) (0.048) (0.071) (0.021) (0.044) (0.039) 
asian -6.438*** 0.052 0.318*** -0.020 -0.045** 0.039 -0.001 
 (0.913) (0.038) (0.038) (0.060) (0.019) (0.035) (0.051) 
native american -1.559 -0.014 0.139* 0.133 -0.043 -0.032 -0.052 
 (1.496) (0.080) (0.082) (0.120) (0.041) (0.075) (0.071) 
other 0.566 0.113 0.078 0.000 -0.036 0.100 0.048 
 (1.527) (0.088) (0.071) (0.107) (0.035) (0.071) (0.076) 
Education:        
high school -0.665 -0.075 0.011 0.050 0.037 0.064 -0.082 
 (1.436) (0.056) (0.065) (0.102) (0.024) (0.059) (0.057) 
some college 0.806 0.017 0.024 -0.114 0.016 0.080 0.028 
 (1.446) (0.056) (0.065) (0.102) (0.025) (0.059) (0.057) 
associate degree -1.313 0.097 0.008 -0.154 -0.032 0.052 0.030 
 (1.520) (0.062) (0.069) (0.109) (0.030) (0.063) (0.062) 
college -1.679 0.117* -0.067 -0.224** -0.048 0.034 0.125** 
 (1.493) (0.060) (0.068) (0.106) (0.029) (0.062) (0.061) 
graduate school -2.666 0.101 -0.093 -0.196* -0.055 0.028 0.112* 
 (1.655) (0.064) (0.072) (0.112) (0.034) (0.065) (0.068) 
Occupation:        
administrative support -1.353 -0.118*** 0.226*** 0.176*** 0.039** 0.243*** 0.015 
 (0.889) (0.041) (0.042) (0.067) (0.018) (0.037) (0.034) 
professional and technical -0.703 -0.100*** 0.216*** 0.231*** 0.027** 0.261*** 0.069** 
 (0.581) (0.029) (0.029) (0.043) (0.013) (0.027) (0.027) 
sales -4.126*** -0.213*** 0.296*** 0.367*** 0.070*** 0.494*** -0.072* 
 (0.922) (0.046) (0.049) (0.075) (0.017) (0.038) (0.042) 
customer service -1.231 -0.155*** 0.320*** 0.062 0.055*** 0.301*** 0.041 
 (0.791) (0.047) (0.049) (0.079) (0.020) (0.045) (0.043) 
management -2.655*** -0.214*** 0.392*** 0.461*** 0.089*** 0.443*** 0.428*** 
 (0.708) (0.035) (0.036) (0.054) (0.013) (0.032) (0.041) 
Constant 5.645*** 2.007*** 3.196*** 4.277***   2.378*** 1.834*** 
 (2.105) (0.096) (0.102) (0.153)  (0.093) (0.098) 
Observations 8237 8387 8386 8408 8379 8258 7209 
Pseudo R-squared 0.009       0.053     
Adjusted R-Squared   0.085 0.058 0.056   0.102 0.083 
Note:  Equations are estimated using OLS except for the DAYSABS equation which is estimated using Tobit., and the LONGTIME equation 
which is estimated using Probit (with Probit marginal effects presented in table entries). Robust standard are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  The omitted category for the ethnicity dummy variable group is WHITE, the omitted 
category for the education dummy variable group is NO HIGH SCHOOL, the omitted category for the occupation dummy variable group is 
PRODUCTION.    
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Table 5: Effect of MATCH1 (against omitted base group NOMATCH1) on Worker 
Outcomes (using compensation risk variable COMPRISK1) 
 
 daysabs lookhard motivation jobsatisfac longtime loyal suggestions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
match1 -0.386* -0.025** 0.026** 0.065*** 0.012** 0.059*** -0.053*** 
 (0.223) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) 
age -0.079*** -0.009*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.008*** -0.004*** 
 (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
female 2.820*** -0.091*** 0.080*** 0.108*** 0.020*** 0.102*** -0.122*** 
 (0.323) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) 
union 0.494 0.269*** -0.125*** -0.197*** -0.087*** -0.138*** 0.009 
 (0.661) (0.036) (0.036) (0.052) (0.015) (0.033) (0.030) 
tenure -0.003 -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.001** -0.001 0.003*** 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
basepay 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
hours -0.160*** 0.002** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.001** 0.006*** 0.008*** 
 (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
atmkt -0.787*** -0.277*** 0.180*** 0.451*** 0.092*** 0.245*** -0.032** 
 (0.232) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) 
Ethnicity:        
hispanic -1.376*** 0.027 0.166*** 0.225*** -0.035*** 0.124*** 0.058* 
 (0.461) (0.029) (0.030) (0.046) (0.013) (0.026) (0.035) 
black -0.574 0.171*** 0.163*** 0.057 -0.046*** -0.106*** -0.180*** 
 (0.587) (0.036) (0.036) (0.053) (0.015) (0.032) (0.030) 
asian -3.271*** 0.018 0.228*** 0.021 -0.034*** 0.057*** -0.029 
 (0.458) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.010) (0.019) (0.036) 
native american 0.541 0.000 0.088 0.131 -0.041 -0.036 -0.062 
 (1.100) (0.059) (0.068) (0.093) (0.029) (0.057) (0.054) 
other -0.373 0.164*** 0.052 -0.085 -0.058*** 0.017 0.054 
 (0.769) (0.050) (0.045) (0.064) (0.021) (0.040) (0.060) 
Education:        
high school -0.046 -0.052 -0.036 0.020 0.025 -0.018 -0.045 
 (0.845) (0.040) (0.047) (0.072) (0.016) (0.039) (0.040) 
some college 0.893 0.050 -0.025 -0.126* 0.001 -0.010 0.051 
 (0.849) (0.040) (0.046) (0.071) (0.017) (0.039) (0.041) 
associate degree -0.711 0.091** -0.038 -0.202*** -0.032 -0.028 0.058 
 (0.882) (0.043) (0.049) (0.075) (0.021) (0.042) (0.044) 
college -1.402 0.126*** -0.058 -0.227*** -0.037* -0.034 0.149*** 
 (0.859) (0.041) (0.047) (0.072) (0.019) (0.040) (0.043) 
graduate school -2.242** 0.148*** -0.074 -0.230*** -0.060*** -0.028 0.172*** 
 (0.908) (0.043) (0.049) (0.075) (0.022) (0.041) (0.048) 
Occupation:        
administrative support -1.617*** -0.149*** 0.290*** 0.288*** 0.046*** 0.328*** -0.002 
 (0.551) (0.030) (0.030) (0.048) (0.011) (0.027) (0.024) 
professional and technical -0.616* -0.136*** 0.228*** 0.259*** 0.041*** 0.295*** 0.085*** 
 (0.334) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.008) (0.017) (0.020) 
sales -3.457*** -0.242*** 0.300*** 0.450*** 0.071*** 0.455*** -0.053* 
 (0.518) (0.025) (0.027) (0.039) (0.009) (0.022) (0.028) 
customer service -0.933 -0.136*** 0.313*** 0.033 0.028* 0.303*** 0.067** 
 (0.620) (0.037) (0.040) (0.062) (0.015) (0.035) (0.033) 
management -1.990*** -0.201*** 0.368*** 0.430*** 0.069*** 0.440*** 0.454*** 
 (0.402) (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.008) (0.020) (0.029) 
Constant 6.605*** 2.144*** 3.234*** 4.080***   2.381*** 1.916*** 
 (1.214) (0.062) (0.066) (0.100)  (0.058) (0.068) 
Observations 18974 19318 19346 19371 19324 19065 13732 
Pseudo R-squared 0.013       0.053     
Adjusted R-squared   0.074 0.081 0.066   0.114 0.122 
Note:  Equations are estimated using OLS except for the DAYSABS equation which is estimated using Tobit., and the LONGTIME equation 
which is estimated using Probit (with Probit marginal effects presented in table entries). Robust standard are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  The omitted category for the ethnicity dummy variable group is WHITE, the omitted 
category for the education dummy variable group is NO HIGH SCHOOL, the omitted category for the occupation dummy variable group is 
PRODUCTION.    
    
 
28 
 
 
Table 6: Effect of HIGHMATCH1 and LOWMATCH1 (against omitted base group 
NOMATCH1) on Worker Outcomes (using compensation risk variable COMPRISK1) 
 
 daysabs lookhard motivation jobsatisfac longtime loyal suggestions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
highmatch1 -0.460* 0.001 0.077*** 0.091*** 0.013** 0.091*** 0.027* 
 (0.257) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.006) (0.013) (0.016) 
lowmatch1 -0.242 -0.083*** -0.088*** 0.004 0.009 -0.014 -0.158*** 
 (0.326) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.008) (0.018) (0.016) 
age -0.079*** -0.009*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.008*** -0.004*** 
 (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
female 2.807*** -0.086*** 0.089*** 0.113*** 0.021*** 0.108*** -0.109*** 
 (0.327) (0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) 
union 0.477 0.276*** -0.112*** -0.190*** -0.087*** -0.130*** 0.024 
 (0.664) (0.036) (0.036) (0.052) (0.015) (0.033) (0.030) 
tenure -0.002 -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.001** -0.001 0.002*** 
 (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
basepay 0.000 -0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
hours -0.160*** 0.002** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.001** 0.005*** 0.008*** 
 (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
atmkt -0.785*** -0.278*** 0.178*** 0.450*** 0.092*** 0.243*** -0.032** 
 (0.232) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) 
Ethnicity:        
hispanic -1.376*** 0.027 0.166*** 0.225*** -0.035*** 0.124*** 0.058* 
 (0.461) (0.029) (0.030) (0.046) (0.013) (0.026) (0.035) 
black -0.570 0.170*** 0.161*** 0.056 -0.046*** -0.107*** -0.185*** 
 (0.587) (0.036) (0.036) (0.053) (0.015) (0.032) (0.030) 
asian -3.254*** 0.012 0.217*** 0.015 -0.034*** 0.050*** -0.033 
 (0.461) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.010) (0.019) (0.036) 
native american 0.542 -0.000 0.087 0.130 -0.041 -0.038 -0.063 
 (1.100) (0.059) (0.068) (0.093) (0.029) (0.057) (0.054) 
other -0.363 0.160*** 0.044 -0.089 -0.058*** 0.012 0.050 
 (0.769) (0.050) (0.045) (0.064) (0.021) (0.040) (0.060) 
Education:        
high school -0.041 -0.053 -0.040 0.018 0.025 -0.020 -0.050 
 (0.846) (0.040) (0.047) (0.072) (0.016) (0.040) (0.041) 
some college 0.908 0.045 -0.036 -0.132* 0.001 -0.017 0.037 
 (0.850) (0.040) (0.046) (0.071) (0.017) (0.039) (0.041) 
associate degree -0.695 0.086** -0.050 -0.208*** -0.032 -0.035 0.043 
 (0.883) (0.043) (0.049) (0.075) (0.021) (0.042) (0.044) 
college -1.384 0.119*** -0.072 -0.234*** -0.037* -0.043 0.134*** 
 (0.861) (0.041) (0.047) (0.072) (0.019) (0.040) (0.043) 
graduate school -2.223** 0.140*** -0.089* -0.238*** -0.060*** -0.038 0.158*** 
 (0.910) (0.043) (0.049) (0.075) (0.022) (0.041) (0.048) 
Occupation:        
administrative support -1.603*** -0.154*** 0.280*** 0.283*** 0.046*** 0.322*** -0.008 
 (0.553) (0.030) (0.030) (0.048) (0.011) (0.027) (0.024) 
professional and technical -0.593* -0.145*** 0.210*** 0.249*** 0.041*** 0.283*** 0.076*** 
 (0.338) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.008) (0.018) (0.020) 
sales -3.420*** -0.256*** 0.272*** 0.435*** 0.071*** 0.437*** -0.080*** 
 (0.530) (0.026) (0.027) (0.040) (0.009) (0.022) (0.028) 
customer service -0.932 -0.136*** 0.312*** 0.033 0.028* 0.303*** 0.065** 
 (0.620) (0.037) (0.040) (0.062) (0.015) (0.035) (0.032) 
management -1.969*** -0.210*** 0.351*** 0.421*** 0.069*** 0.429*** 0.432*** 
 (0.407) (0.022) (0.024) (0.035) (0.008) (0.020) (0.028) 
Constant 6.536*** 2.170*** 3.286*** 4.107***   2.414*** 1.962*** 
 (1.221) (0.062) (0.067) (0.100)  (0.058) (0.068) 
Observations 18974 19318 19346 19371 19324 19065 13732 
Pseudo R-squared 0.013       0.053     
Adjusted R-squared   0.075 0.083 0.066   0.115 0.127 
Note:  Equations are estimated using OLS except for the DAYSABS equation which is estimated using Tobit., and the LONGTIME equation 
which is estimated using Probit (with Probit marginal effects presented in table entries). Robust standard are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  The omitted category for the ethnicity dummy variable group is WHITE, the omitted 
category for the education dummy variable group is NO HIGH SCHOOL, the omitted category for the occupation dummy variable group is 
PRODUCTION.    
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Table 7: In the subsample of workers with NOMATCH1=1 (i.e., MATCH1=0), Effect of 
NOMATCH10 (against omitted base group NOMATCH011) on Worker Outcomes (using 
compensation risk variable COMPRISK1) 
 
 daysabs lookhard motivation jobsatisfac longtime loyal suggestions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
nomatch101 -0.036 0.130*** 0.013 -0.075** -0.039*** -0.084*** 0.068*** 
 (0.404) (0.020) (0.021) (0.032) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) 
age -0.093*** -0.009*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.001* 0.009*** -0.003*** 
 (0.022) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
female 3.190*** -0.107*** 0.129*** 0.156*** 0.035*** 0.150*** -0.121*** 
 (0.517) (0.021) (0.021) (0.032) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) 
union 0.812 0.161*** -0.105** -0.158** -0.055*** -0.108*** 0.010 
 (0.928) (0.042) (0.043) (0.064) (0.019) (0.040) (0.037) 
tenure -0.021 -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 0.000 -0.002* 0.004*** 
 (0.028) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
basepay 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
hours -0.142*** 0.003** 0.006*** 0.002 0.001 0.004*** 0.007*** 
 (0.037) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
atmkt -0.574 -0.298*** 0.181*** 0.471*** 0.101*** 0.269*** -0.048*** 
 (0.392) (0.020) (0.020) (0.029) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) 
Ethnicity:        
hispanic -1.678** 0.021 0.202*** 0.276*** -0.009 0.144*** 0.092* 
 (0.792) (0.043) (0.045) (0.070) (0.020) (0.041) (0.047) 
black -0.166 0.200*** 0.153*** 0.063 -0.042** -0.129*** -0.152*** 
 (0.914) (0.048) (0.048) (0.071) (0.021) (0.044) (0.039) 
asian -6.368*** 0.057 0.316*** -0.021 -0.046** 0.039 -0.004 
 (0.912) (0.038) (0.038) (0.060) (0.019) (0.035) (0.051) 
native american -1.539 -0.007 0.143* 0.137 -0.043 -0.037 -0.043 
 (1.494) (0.081) (0.083) (0.121) (0.041) (0.075) (0.071) 
other 0.621 0.121 0.070 -0.000 -0.038 0.095 0.056 
 (1.527) (0.088) (0.072) (0.108) (0.035) (0.071) (0.077) 
Education:        
high school -0.588 -0.068 0.011 0.041 0.034 0.059 -0.078 
 (1.435) (0.056) (0.065) (0.102) (0.024) (0.059) (0.057) 
some college 0.828 0.026 0.025 -0.121 0.013 0.072 0.030 
 (1.447) (0.056) (0.065) (0.102) (0.025) (0.059) (0.057) 
associate degree -1.252 0.104* 0.011 -0.165 -0.034 0.046 0.032 
 (1.517) (0.062) (0.069) (0.109) (0.031) (0.064) (0.061) 
college -1.742 0.115* -0.067 -0.231** -0.047 0.030 0.117* 
 (1.494) (0.060) (0.068) (0.106) (0.030) (0.062) (0.061) 
graduate school -2.574 0.093 -0.091 -0.197* -0.054 0.027 0.099 
 (1.653) (0.065) (0.072) (0.112) (0.034) (0.066) (0.068) 
Occupation:        
administrative support -1.407 -0.119*** 0.219*** 0.190*** 0.040** 0.249*** 0.015 
 (0.897) (0.042) (0.042) (0.067) (0.018) (0.037) (0.034) 
professional and technical -0.817 -0.111*** 0.207*** 0.243*** 0.031** 0.264*** 0.066** 
 (0.579) (0.029) (0.030) (0.044) (0.013) (0.027) (0.028) 
sales -4.253*** -0.205*** 0.291*** 0.373*** 0.069*** 0.486*** -0.074* 
 (0.939) (0.047) (0.050) (0.075) (0.018) (0.039) (0.043) 
customer service -1.430* -0.156*** 0.322*** 0.066 0.055*** 0.310*** 0.045 
 (0.800) (0.048) (0.050) (0.080) (0.020) (0.046) (0.043) 
management -2.643*** -0.222*** 0.387*** 0.473*** 0.091*** 0.450*** 0.429*** 
 (0.708) (0.035) (0.036) (0.054) (0.013) (0.032) (0.041) 
Constant 5.813*** 2.040*** 3.256*** 4.256***   2.390*** 1.891*** 
 (2.093) (0.096) (0.102) (0.153)  (0.093) (0.097) 
Observations 8137 8287 8287 8309 8281 8160 7131 
Pseudo R-squared 0.009       0.051     
Adjusted R-squared   0.083 0.057 0.056   0.102 0.081 
Note:  Equations are estimated using OLS except for the DAYSABS equation which is estimated using Tobit., and the LONGTIME equation 
which is estimated using Probit (with Probit marginal effects presented in table entries). Robust standard are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  The omitted category for the ethnicity dummy variable group ETH_1, the omitted 
category for the education dummy variable group is NOHS, the omitted category for the occupation dummy variable group is PRDN.    
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A: In the subsample of workers with low LOVERISK, Effect of NOMATCH01 
(against omitted base group MATCH) on Worker Outcomes (using compensation risk 
variable COMPRISK) 
 
 daysabs lookhard motivation jobsatisfac longtime loyal suggestions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
nomatch01 0.345 -0.043 0.047 0.031 0.023* 0.067** 0.052** 
 (0.404) (0.026) (0.030) (0.043) (0.012) (0.026) (0.025) 
age -0.089*** -0.009*** 0.004*** 0.007*** -0.000 0.007*** -0.004*** 
 (0.024) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
female 2.383*** -0.077*** 0.156*** 0.112*** 0.021* 0.116*** -0.119*** 
 (0.435) (0.024) (0.028) (0.039) (0.011) (0.024) (0.023) 
union -0.248 0.426*** -0.214*** -0.182* -0.134*** -0.202*** -0.076 
 (0.819) (0.075) (0.079) (0.107) (0.033) (0.068) (0.055) 
tenure 0.003 -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.009*** 0.001* 0.000 0.004*** 
 (0.023) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
basepay 0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
hours -0.161*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.005* 0.001 0.010*** 0.006*** 
 (0.041) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
atmkt -0.641 -0.262*** 0.192*** 0.447*** 0.091*** 0.267*** 0.003 
 (0.399) (0.024) (0.027) (0.038) (0.011) (0.024) (0.022) 
Ethnicity:        
hispanic -0.758 -0.030 0.178*** 0.190* -0.079** 0.132** -0.013 
 (0.740) (0.059) (0.063) (0.102) (0.032) (0.056) (0.065) 
black -0.858 0.127* 0.237*** -0.018 -0.035 -0.122* -0.158*** 
 (0.788) (0.067) (0.073) (0.110) (0.029) (0.064) (0.055) 
asian -3.080*** 0.094* 0.292*** 0.157* -0.054** 0.124*** 0.153 
 (0.846) (0.051) (0.056) (0.081) (0.026) (0.044) (0.099) 
native american 2.698 -0.047 0.177 0.243 -0.045 0.067 0.059 
 (2.391) (0.089) (0.121) (0.178) (0.051) (0.097) (0.102) 
other -0.775 0.149 0.126 0.063 -0.026 -0.075 0.098 
 (1.064) (0.119) (0.109) (0.163) (0.048) (0.104) (0.112) 
Education:        
high school 0.113 -0.039 -0.073 -0.055 0.006 -0.085 -0.022 
 (0.964) (0.071) (0.081) (0.123) (0.029) (0.069) (0.063) 
some college 0.509 0.058 -0.005 -0.160 -0.019 -0.056 0.047 
 (0.961) (0.074) (0.082) (0.125) (0.031) (0.071) (0.064) 
associate degree -0.820 0.055 -0.034 -0.222* -0.017 -0.062 0.062 
 (1.016) (0.079) (0.088) (0.134) (0.036) (0.077) (0.070) 
college -1.112 0.081 -0.169** -0.238* -0.049 -0.096 0.067 
 (1.007) (0.078) (0.086) (0.131) (0.036) (0.074) (0.071) 
graduate school -1.933* 0.067 -0.137 -0.208 -0.056 -0.095 0.076 
 (1.149) (0.084) (0.093) (0.138) (0.042) (0.078) (0.085) 
Occupation:        
administrative support -2.599*** -0.160*** 0.304*** 0.394*** 0.079*** 0.391*** 0.039 
 (0.630) (0.044) (0.049) (0.076) (0.015) (0.041) (0.038) 
professional and technical -0.478 -0.088** 0.227*** 0.201*** 0.048*** 0.277*** 0.111*** 
 (0.572) (0.035) (0.040) (0.056) (0.015) (0.035) (0.035) 
sales -1.175 -0.158** 0.255*** 0.310*** 0.055** 0.417*** -0.084** 
 (1.319) (0.067) (0.076) (0.113) (0.023) (0.056) (0.036) 
customer service -0.525 -0.077 0.212*** -0.183 0.023 0.219*** 0.116** 
 (0.951) (0.062) (0.075) (0.118) (0.028) (0.065) (0.053) 
management -1.095 -0.113** 0.316*** 0.294*** 0.066*** 0.369*** 0.383*** 
 (0.738) (0.048) (0.057) (0.084) (0.017) (0.047) (0.060) 
Constant 7.362*** 2.055*** 3.158*** 4.248***   2.306*** 1.879*** 
 (2.127) (0.119) (0.136) (0.191)  (0.113) (0.122) 
Observations 4573 4639 4635 4649 4632 4573 3652 
Pseudo R-squared 0.009       0.054     
Adjusted R-squared   0.079 0.069 0.050   0.106 0.082 
Note:  Equations are estimated using OLS except for the DAYSABS equation which is estimated using Tobit., and the LONGTIME equation 
which is estimated using Probit (with Probit marginal effects presented in table entries). Robust standard are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  The omitted category for the ethnicity dummy variable group is WHITE, the omitted 
category for the education dummy variable group is NO HIGH SCHOOL, the omitted category for the occupation dummy variable group is 
PRODUCTION.    
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